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INTRODUCTION
A significant objective of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
for the period 2014-2020 is the allocation of the funds in a more equitable way
among Member States and farmers. Now that the transitional measures to inte-
grate the new Member States into the CAP are coming to an end, greater con-
vergence in the distribution of payments has been legitimately requested from
these countries. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the vast majority of
the CAP’s budget is distributed to a small number of large and wealthy farmers,
leaving the remaining funds for the rest of the farm population.
The main question addressed by this paper is how to reach a more equitable
distribution of CAP’s payments pragmatically, politically and economically?
Pragmatically, the CAP is a multi-functional policy, which has to combine dif-
ferent goals, i.e. to be more equitable, green and market-oriented. However,
these objectives are not always compatible and require trade-offs. Politically,
regarding the CAP’s significant share (40%) of the EU budget and the current
public debt crisis, Member States are most likely to keep their attention on the
juste retour calculations rather than the promotion of the European public inter-
est in the EU negotiations. Economically, reaching a more equitable distribution
of payments should be achieved without significant disruptive changes that
could have serious consequences on the costs and benefits of the agricultural
sector in the EU. Considering these elements, it is already clear that reaching a
more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments represents a difficult challenge.
In order to analyse how to reach a more equitable distribution, the history of
the distribution of payments must be first reminded (part 1) and the different
aspects of “inequity” in the current distribution must be analysed (part 2).
Before analysing the proposals of the Commission to improve the present situa-
tion, it is important to realise why the difficulty of understanding what lies
behind the abstract notion of equity makes it even more difficult to determine
what should be a “fair” allocation of payments. Furthermore, regarding the
different perception of a “fair” distribution of funds among Member States, one
can wonder who should take care of equity in the distribution of CAP’s funds:
the EU or the Member States? (part 3) Finally, the different measures in the
Commission’s proposals to introduce more equity among Member States and
farmers in the CAP post-2013 will be presented and assessed (part 4).5
1. THE EVOLUTION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE CAP’S PAYMENTS
The allocation of the CAP budget among Member States, farmers, the different
regions and types of production is clearly not equitable. Although what lies
behind the notion of equity in the CAP will be analyse in section 3, it is impor-
tant to note that the meaning of equitable distribution must not be understood
as equal distribution. Considering the very different economic and natural con-
ditions of agricultural producers across the EU, the CAP has never aimed to
reach an equal distribution of payments. The reasons of inequity in the CAP’s
payments must therefore be explained by the political economy and the histori-
cal developments of the policy.
The amount of money dedicated to the CAP in the EU budget decreased from
about 70% in the 1980s to some 40% today. Although this decrease is not neg-
ligible, the policy remains the largest envelope of EU funds. As such, the alloca-
tion of the CAP’s funds is a major source of tensions during the budget negoti-
ations, each Member State being concerned with the calculation of its juste
retour. This context undermines the promotion of the European public interest
and leads to situations of unfairness.
Originally, the CAP was based on production support. By the 1980s, this led to
increasingly important market interventions in order to buy the huge surpluses
and to subsidize the exports to the international market. The EU’s protectionist
agricultural policy and its important budget became very difficult to justify.
Since the beginning of the 90’s, the CAP has therefore progressively moved from
a market support to a direct income support to producers.
The first important reform in 1992 created direct income payments coupled to
production in compensation for price reductions for some key products. The
second reform, approved in 1999, introduced a double pillar structure to
finance CAP expenditures. The first pillar continued to focus on direct income
payments and market measures, while the second pillar was devoted to rural
development to support sustainable agriculture and dynamic rural areas across
the EU. Contrary to pillar 1, which is solely funded by the EU budget, pillar 2
is based on a multi-annual programming approach where MS establish and co-
finance national and regional programmes according to their needs. In 2003, the
last and most important reform – the ‘Fischler’ reform – particularly focused on
the first pillar via the establishment of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). This
scheme replaces most existing direct income payments by decoupling them. This
means that support is made independent from any obligation to produce. DirectINTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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income payments are subordinated to the respect of community rules, notably
those regarding the environment (‘cross-compliance’). A financial mechanism
called ‘modulation’ was also made compulsory in 2003. Under this mechanism,
the direct payments exceeding € 5.000per year are decreased by a fixed percent-
age. The funds made available from the first pillar in this way are then trans-
ferred to finance part of the rural development measures of the second pillar.
The implementation of the SPS is characterised by a great flexibility for Member
States. Three models are made available, plus a simplified and optional model
established for the new Member States. In the first ‘historic model’, payment
entitlements are based on the individual payments received during the three-year
reference period (2000, 2001 and 2002) and the number of hectares farmed
during that period. In the second ‘regional model’, payment entitlements are
calculated on the basis of the sum of payments received by all farmers in a region
during the reference period divided by the number of eligible hectare in that
region. The third approach leaves a range of ‘hybrid models’ of calculation to
Member States, combining the historic and the regional models. These hybrid
models may be static or dynamic. In a dynamic system, there is an evolution
from a historic towards a regional model. The historic model is currently the
most common approach in the EU-15 but also the most questionable. More
than being based on old historical references, this approach has led to important
disparities in the distribution of funds between Member States, farmers, regions
and types of production. With regard to the new Member States (EU-12), they
could choose to apply a simplified scheme called the single area payment system
(SAPS) until the end of 2013 or directly the SPS. Under the SAPS, payment levels
are established following a similar manner as for the regional model. Currently,
10 out of the 12 NMS apply this latter system.
In 2008, a CAP ‘Health Check’ led to, inter alia, further decoupling of direct
payments and reinforced modulation. More flexibility in the implementation of
the CAP was also granted to Member States. They have the option to take up
10% of their direct payments national envelope to be used for environmental
measures or improving the quality and marketing of products in vulnerable sec-
tors, as well as for risk management measures.1
In a nutshell, along the different reforms, the Common Agricultural Policy has
become increasingly less common as the support systems have become increas-
ingly different between and within Member States. This situation has increas-
ingly developed arguments for more equity in the CAP.
1.  Article 68 of the Regulation EC 73/2009.7
2. THE LACK OF EQUITY IN THE CURRENT 
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS
2.1. The lack of equity among Member States
 The disparities in direct payments
The allocation of direct payments, which represents nearly 70% of the CAP
budget, is far from being equitable. The direct support received in old Member
States remains largely linked to the average production and support during a
historic period. Therefore, Member States that used to receive the most impor-
tant support coupled to production are still the biggest beneficiaries of the CAP.
Figure 1 shows that France, Germany, Spain and Italy are the Member States
that beneficiated the most of Pillar 1 payments in 2008 and will continue to do
so in 2013.
Big differences in the allocation of pillar 1 payments can be observed between
the new and old Member States (see Figures 1 and 2, p. 10-11). Two main rea-
sons can explain this situation. Firstly, following the EU enlargement in 2004
and 2007, transitional measures were necessary in order to integrate 12 new
Member States into the CAP. These measures were required in order to take into
account the significant difference in the price situation between Eastern and
Western Europe and to avoid major budgetary shocks for the EU-15. The key
issue was to extend direct payments to the new Member States. It was therefore
decided that they would be phased-in over a period of 10 years, starting at a
level of 25% of the EU-15 level in year 1 (i.e. 2007 for Romania and Bulgaria
and 2004 for the other New Member States). Secondly, contrary to the EU-15,
the implementation of direct payments in the EU-12 are not linked to actual
historic support levels, as the new Member States were not yet part of the EU
during the reference period. Therefore, the EU-12 support levels had to be esti-
mated based on historic production.2 Both reasons explain the relatively low
level of direct support received by the EU-12, resulting in unequal conditions in
terms of competition.
Figure 1 (p. 10) shows the disparities in the distribution of pillar 1 payments
between Member States, especially between the EU-15 and the EU-12. In 2008,
out of the € 37.569 million allocated from the CAP budget to Pillar 1 direct
payments, the EU-15 received around 91%, while the EU-12 got only the
2. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011b).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
8
remaining 9%. In the preview of the 2013 payments’ distribution, which coin-
cides with the CAP’s reform period, one can observe that direct payments com-
mitment entitlements will have increased in every country but in Greece and that
the disparities between the EU-15 and the EU-12 will have slightly decreased.
Out of the € 45.062 million distributed to Pillar 1, the EU-15 will still receive
81,5%, while the EU-12 will obtain 18,5%. However, about 22% of the
exploited agricultural area and around 51% of agricultural workers are in the
EU-12.3 The share of direct payments in the EU-12’s GDP is therefore higher
than in the EU-15’s.
Figure 2 (p. 11) shows clearly that important differences in the distribution of
payments per hectare exist between Member States. While these disparities are
notable between the EU-15 countries, they are considerable between the EU-15
and the EU-12. For instance, the preview of direct support received per hectare
in 2013 ranges from € 544 in Greece to only € 83 in Latvia.
In order to try to provide a level playing field for the farmers during the transi-
tion period, the EU-12 are allowed to top-up direct payments in two ways:
either by distributing a maximum complement of 30% from the national
budget, or by transferring up to 20% of rural development funds to direct pay-
ments (‘negative modulation’). Indeed, the following section’s point will show
that the disparity between the EU-12 and the EU-15 is partially balanced by the
allocation of rural development payments under pillar 2.
 The disparities in rural development payments
The rural development payments are co-financed with Member States under
Pillar 2. Representing about 20% of the CAP budget, pillar 2 payments are more
evenly distributed than Pillar 1 payments, especially between the EU-12 and the
EU-15. In 2008, out of the € 14.639 million spent in rural development meas-
ures, the EU-12 got € 5.714 million (about 39%) (see Figure 2). It is important
to underline that in some Member States such as Austria, Latvia, Finland, Lux-
embourg, Poland, Estonia and Austria, Pillar 2 payments account for a greater
share of farm incomes than Pillar 1 direct payments. By contrast, Pillar 2 repre-
sents only a small share of farm income in the Netherlands, Spain, Cyprus,
Greece and Denmark.4
On the basis of strategic objectives set at EU level, Member States implement
very different rural development policies, reflecting their economic, natural and
3.  BUREAU, Jean-Christophe and WITZKE Heinz-Peter (2010).
4.  Ibidem.INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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structural conditions. Belgium, for instance, has decided to spend 50% of its
second pillar payments for the 2007-2013 programming period to enhance farm
competitiveness and 38% to preserve the rural environment. In contrast, Ireland
allocates 10% to improve farm competitiveness and devotes 80% to protect the
rural environment.5
In order to reduce the unbalance in the payments’ distribution of the first and
second pillars, compulsory modulation6 was introduced in 2003. This mecha-
nism reduces direct payments exceeding € 5.000 by a certain percentage, after
which the resources made available in this way are transferred to finance the
second pillar. The new EU-12 Member States have been exempted from modu-
lation until the transition to the full level of direct support is achieved (i.e. in
2013 for the new EU-10 and in 2016 for Romania and Bulgaria). In the 2008
agreement, it was decided to increase the size of the cut in direct payments
exceeding € 5.000 from 5% to 10% in 2012. In addition, beneficiaries receiving
direct payments exceeding € 300.000 per year have an additional cut of 4% in
their support since 2009.
The amount generated via modulation and transferred to rural development
measures reaches more than a billion euro a year. The redistribution of funds
made available by modulation between the EU-15 does not follow a one-for-one
basis but the redistributive effect among Member States is very weak. If Member
States do not receive a minimum return amount of 80% of their modulated
money, they are allocated additional funds to reach this level. It is noteworthy
that the threshold of € 5.000 under which direct payments remain untouched
makes the cut in direct payments above this amount different among Member
States. The countries with a structure mostly characterised by small farms and
by a production less oriented towards products whose support is granted via
direct payments are small contributors and net beneficiaries.7
2.2. The lack of equity among farmers
The distribution of support is also largely unequal among farmers. The most
outspoken criticism of the current allocation of payments is the concentration
of income support benefits into the hands of big farms that do not suffer from
low incomes. For instance, the public opinion is often shocked to learn that, as
5.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011a).
6.  Some particular Member States (currently, Portugal and the UK) have also the option to apply volun-
tary modulation but the maximum rate of combined compulsory and voluntary modulation is limited to
20% of direct payments.
7.  HENKE, Roberto and SARDONE, Roberta (2008).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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Figure 1: Distribution of EU financed CAP payments among Member States 
(Million Euro)
Member States
2008 
Pillar 1 
payments
2008 
Pillar 2 
payments
2013 
Pillar 1 
payments
2013 
Pillar 2 
payments
Austria 709 595 752 533
Belgium 560 64 615 78
Denmark 972 129 1049 106
Finland 544 319 571 289
France 8081 959 8521 1279
Germany 5496 1187 5853 1387
Greece 2405 463 2217 672
Ireland 1276 355 1341 352
Italy 3813 1617 4370 1441
Luxembourg 35 14 37 13
Netherlands 794 73 898 103
Portugal 570 588 606 611
Spain 4921 1549 5139 1284
Sweden 718 277 771 267
United Kingdom 3422 736 3988 749
Bulgariaa 166 581 580 396
Cyprus 19 25 53 21
Czech Republic 380 393 909 424
Estonia 41 96 101 113
Hungary 543 538 1319 585
Latvia 62 301 146 151
Lithuania 158 249 380 254
Malta 2 24 5 11
Poland 1248 1933 3045 1851
Romaniaa 422 1147 1264 1356
Slovakia 156 287 388 320
Slovenia 56 140 144 113
EU-15 34316 8925 36728 9164
EU-12 3253 5714 8334 5595
EU-27 37569 14639 45062 14759
a. Note that Bulgaria and Romania will only have their full payments phased in 2016.
Source: European Council and European CommissionINTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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a big landowner, the Queen of England is one of the largest beneficiaries of the
CAP in the UK.
Figure 2: Distribution of EU financed CAP payments among Member States per hectare 
of Utilised Agricultural Area (Million Euro)
Member States
2008 
Pillar 1 pay-
ments
2008 
Pillar 2 pay-
ments
2013 
Pillar 1 pay-
ments
2013 
Pillar 2 pay-
ments
Austria 222 186 236 167
Belgium 408 47 447 57
Denmark 365 48 394 40
Finland 237 139 249 126
France 294 35 310 47
Germany 325 70 346 82
Greece 590 114 544 165
Ireland 308 86 324 85
Italy 299 127 343 113
Luxembourg 264 104 283 101
Netherlands 415 38 469 54
Portugal 164 169 174 176
Spain 198 62 206 52
Sweden 230 89 247 86
United Kingdom 212 46 247 46
Bulgariaa 55 191 190 130
Cyprus 133 170 366 144
Czech Republic 108 112 258 121
Estonia 45 105 112 125
Hungary 128 127 312 138
Latvia 35 169 83 85
Lithuania 60 94 143 96
Malta 155 2320 494 1032
Poland 81 125 197 120
Romaniaa 31 83 92 99
Slovakia 81 72 200 165
Slovenia 115 586 295 231
a. Note that Bulgaria and Romania will only have their full payments phased in 2016.
Source: European Commission, EurostatINTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
12
In 2007, the 25% largest farms received 74% of total support (from both pillar
1 and 2) in the EU-27. During the same year, the annual income of the 25%
largest farms in the EU-15 was of about € 73.000, representing around three
times the average level of income of all beneficiaries.8 Figure 3 (p. 14) shows
that the variations in direct payments per beneficiary change significantly
among and within Member States. Besides the disparities in direct support
received per hectare (see Figure 2), the reason of these variations is the farms’
size. As the distribution of direct payments to farmers is based on the number of
hectare farmed, a large share of this support goes to countries with large farms.
The distribution of payments per farmer within Member States is also particu-
larly variable, especially in France, the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. In
France in 2006, for instance, the average support received by the top 20% of
farms that receive the largest payments is € 42,700, while the average support
received by the bottom 20% is € 3,000.9
The choice between the several models made available to Member States for the
implementation of the SPS has widely influenced the distribution of support
among farmers. In the historic model, which has been largely retained by Mem-
ber States, direct payments are based on the amounts that were provided to
reduce the effects of cuts in market prices in the past. This approach has led to
important disparities, arising from the difference of aid to specific agricultural
sectors during the reference period. In contrast, the regional model favours a
more equal distribution of aid given that it applies a reference amount for all the
farmers – regardless of their agricultural sectors – in a region.
In order to reduce the income support to the largest farms, the introduction and
the subsequent increase in the rate of modulation has been favoured instead of
capping payments (initially proposed by the Commission). However, modula-
tion regards only a small number of recipients. Moreover, the first objective of
modulation is to shift resources from the first to the second pillar, not to con-
tribute to addressing the current allocation of direct payments.10
Current levels of direct support have an impact on the structures and cost fac-
tors of farms. The benefits of direct support tend to be capitalised into asset
values, in particular land, influencing both the sales and lease prices of land. The
capitalisation of direct payments in asset values is different among Member
States and among the several models for the implementation of direct payments.
While the historic model for decoupled payments is considered the least dam-
ageable approach in terms of impact on farms’ asset value, the regional
8.  OECD (2011a).
9.  BUREAU, Jean-Christophe and WITZKE Heinz-Peter (2010).
10.  EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2011).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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approach tends to aggravate the ‘capitalisation’ of support in both the sales and
lease prices of land.11 Modifying the distribution of support would therefore
have a significant impact on the economic and financial basis of farms. Hence,
a transitional period would be necessary to avoid major disruptive changes in
farms’ operation and viability.12
The present distribution of decoupled payments was necessary in return for
reforms. Another approach than the historic model would have led to major
disruptive changes in farms’ asset values. However, since then, 12 new Member
States have joined the EU and a convergence between internal and external mar-
ket prices has taken place, making the EU quite competitive in most of the agri-
cultural sectors. There is therefore no more compelling justification for the dif-
ferences in support levels.
Furthermore, direct support is considered inefficient in targeting its both objec-
tives, i.e. to deliver income support for farmers and provide a reward for envi-
ronmentally friendly farming practices delivering public goods. The income sup-
port element of direct support does not make sense, as it is the big and wealthy
farms that benefit the most from the CAP. Direct payments are not established
on an analysis of the individual needs of farmers and thus fail in targeting low-
income farmers. As for the argument of the provision of public goods, nothing
more than the subordination of payments to some cross-compliance require-
ments and standards exists in the current system.
11.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011b).
12.  Ibidem.INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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Figure 3: Variation in direct payments per worker (Annual Worker Unit) by 
Member State
Source: FADN 2006, EU-2515
3. WHAT LIES BEHIND THE NOTION OF EQUITY 
IN THE CAP?
As the CAP should go towards a more equitable policy, one can wonder what
lies behind the notion of equity. Behind the abstract notion of equity lies the
notion of fairness and behind fairness, the notion of justice. For centuries, phi-
losophers tried to define the notion of justice but they could not agree on much
more that justice is treating people equally when the circumstances are identical.
Agricultural producers face very heterogeneous ‘circumstances’ across the EU
due to the very different economic and natural conditions. Therefore, in the case
of the CAP, an equal distribution of payments does not mean the same as an
equitable distribution.13
It is important to underline that the CAP is a multi-functional policy. Introduc-
ing more equity in the distribution of support must thus be considered in rela-
tion with other key policy objectives, i.e. contributing to the preservation of
rural areas, and the protection of the environment, while also supporting market
oriented agricultural production. These objectives are not always compatible
and require trade-offs. Depending on the weight given by each Member States
to each objective, the perception of what constitutes an “equitable” distribution
of payments varies widely. As rightly stated by Jean-Christophe Bureau and
Heinz-Peter Witzke14, “finding a EU-wide common point of view on (…) how
“equity” should be introduced in a [multi-functional and] sector-based policy
would be difficult. There is no consensus regarding what “fair” transfers should
be within the EU and whether or not the CAP should have any distribution
objective within the sector itself. In some countries, the fact that large farmers
reap most of the benefits is not an issue, while it is seen as shocking in others.
The fact that less public support is given to smaller, barely viable, farms in less
fertile areas than to efficient farms is not seen as particularly illogical in some
member states. Indeed, the very issue of “compensating for natural handicaps”
even appears bizarre to some member states, while others believe that maintain-
ing farmers all over the EU territory is a fundamental cohesion objective”.
Nevertheless, the concentration of the majority of payments in some Member
States and large farms is mostly the result of history and cannot be legitimately
justified anymore. If the future CAP has to become more equitable, it should
therefore take greater account of the wealth and diversity of agriculture in the
EU through a fairer distribution of funds at all levels. However, a central issue
is who should take care of this equitable distribution; the EU or the Member
13.  D’OULTREMONT, Clémentine (2011).
14.  BUREAU, Jean-Christophe and WITZKE Heinz-Peter (2010).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
16
States? The challenge is to strike the right balance between the need of common
European rules based on objective criteria for a more equitable distribution of
payments between Member States and farmers, and the need of flexibilities for
Member States in the allocation of their national envelope. Leaving a high
degree of subsidiarity to Member States is important to tailor measures that
better address the increasingly different structures and situations within EU agri-
culture. Since 2003, the various reforms have followed this tendency by granting
more and more possibilities for Member States to reallocate the payments in
accordance with their agricultural conditions and their own perception of ‘fair’
distribution.17
4. THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSALS TO 
INTRODUCE MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP POST-
2013
In October 2011, the European Commission presented its legislative proposals
to reform the CAP in the post-2013 period. While these proposals are being
discussed amongst Member States and in the European Parliament, they already
give a preliminary insight of how more equity could be introduced in the CAP
post-2013.
The proposals to reform the CAP have been made in the framework of the EU
budget proposed by the Commission for the next Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (MFF) covering the period 2014-2020. Before deciding on a new alloca-
tion of the CAP’s payments, an important element of the negotiations is there-
fore to know what will be the share of the CAP in the next MFF. The proposal
of the Commission for the next MFF foresees that the overall EU budget should
slightly increase in real terms, while the share of the CAP in the EU budget
should fall from 39% in 2013 to 33% in 2020.
To integrate more equity in the CAP, the objective of the Commission is “to
better target support to certain actions, areas and beneficiaries, as well as to
pave the way for convergence of the level of support within and across Member
States.15” The following section analyses what the Commission proposes in
order to meet this objective.
4.1. More equity among Member States?
 In direct payments
In order to reach more convergence in the distribution of the budget for direct
payments among Member States, the Commission examined different solutions
in its impact assessment.16 Among them, the Commission considered the intro-
duction of an EU flat rate, the use of objective criteria and a more pragmatic
approach that has been finally retained.
An EU wide flat rate has been a highly-defended option in the public debate.
Giving the same amount of direct payment per hectare to all farmers in the EU
15.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011c).
16.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011d).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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is often perceived as a fair solution. However, an “equal” distribution must not
be confused with an “equitable” distribution. As rightly explained by the Com-
mission, this allocation would not only lead to disruptive changes in the farm
cost structure but it would remain largely uneven, both within and between
Member States. The farm size would entirely determine the amount of direct
payment received by the farmer. Yet, farmers face very different economic and
environmental situations across the EU. A same amount of direct payment per
hectare would not have the same impact on income and on the provision of
environmental public goods.
The Commission has thus envisaged another option that takes into account the
different economic and environmental situations across the EU, ensuring a more
equitable and efficient distribution of direct support. Objective criteria have
been defined to determine the allocation of the direct payment budget among
Member States. These objective criteria include; GDP per capita, the amount of
Agricultural Work Units (AWU) or gross value added in agriculture/AWU (for
economic criteria) or areas in less favoured area, Nature 2000 zones and areas
under permanent pasture (for environmental criteria). A selection had to be
made among these criteria. However, the Commission realised that any of the
combination would lead to an important redistribution of the direct payments
budget across Member States.17 This would undermine the balance in overall
EU budget allocation between Member States, making this option politically
very difficult to accept.
Therefore, the Commission has retained a more pragmatic approach in its pro-
posals. The convergence process will take longer, especially for eastern coun-
tries. All countries currently receiving direct payments below 90% of the EU-27
average direct payments (about € 279/hectare) will, over the period 2014-2020,
close one-third of the gap between their current level and 90% of the EU-27
average (see figure 4, p. 19). For balancing the level of payments across the EU-
27, the contribution of Member States whose national envelope will be reduced
should be between 1 and 7%. Consequently, the decrease in direct payments for
the biggest ‘loser’ States (i.e. Italy, Deutschland and France) would not be very
significant. Member States that would benefit from the redistribution, especially
new Member States, have already called for a more ambitious reallocation than
the one proposed by the Commission. However, the ‘loser’ States consider that
the proposal goes far enough.
In a nutshell, the approach followed by the Commission for more convergence
among Member States is, as its name indicates, very pragmatic. The EU execu-
17.  MATTHEWS, Alan (2011a).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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tive was well aware that any policy option with significant redistributive effects
among Member States would not pass the qualified majority vote in the Coun-
cil. However, the lack of ambition of this proposal will certainly not address the
path dependency of Member States on the CAP. On the one hand, by taking not
enough among Member States receiving more than the EU average direct pay-
ments, the path dependency of these countries will remain. On the other hand,
by giving just enough to Member States who are unhappy with their financial
allocation, new paths dependency will be created, leading to an even broader
political impulse behind the CAP.
The Commission tries to make up for the lack of ambition of its redistribution
proposal by stating that the debate on the next MFF for the period 2021-2027
should “focus on the objective of complete convergence through the equal dis-
tribution of direct support across the European Union”18. This statement must
be supported provided that it is understood as the continuation of the conver-
gence process among Member States, not as the adoption of a flat rate implying
an equal payment per hectare everywhere in the EU-27.
18.  Recital 21 of EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011c).
Figure 4: Redistribution between Member States – Pragmatic approach
Source: European CommissionINTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
20
 In rural development payments
The Commission’s proposal for the new Rural Development regulation does not
specify how rural development payments could be distributed among Member
States. This issue has been left to a future Commission implementing act to be
adopted under the examination procedure. This act will have to be based on
objective criteria linked to the three objectives of the Commission’s proposal
(competitiveness of agriculture and forestry, sustainable management of natural
resources and balanced territorial development of rural areas), as well as on past
performance.
On the basis of the different objective criteria given by the Commission’s impact
assessment for rural development19, the simulations made by Alan Matthews
show that a judicious selection of the criteria could reproduce the current allo-
cation.20 According to him, the « so-called ‘objective criteria’ are far from objec-
tive and in fact are highly political. »
The legislative proposals have also introduced the option for Member States to
channel up to 10% of their national envelope under pillar 1 to their rural devel-
opment funds under pillar 2. Besides capping direct support (see below), this is
the only reminder of modulation in the Commission’s proposals. On the other
hand, Member States that receive less than 90% of the EU average for direct
payments (i.e. mainly new Member States) would be allowed to transfer up to
5% of their rural development funds to direct payments under Pillar 1.
4.2. More equity among farmers?
The Commission has proposed to abolish the current direct payment schemes
(i.e. the SPS and the SAPS) and to introduce a new ‘Basic Payment Scheme’ that
should be applied across the EU-27 as from 2014. Based on the current regional
model, this single scheme will allow moving from historic based payments
towards uniform payments per hectare inside each region by 2019. The aban-
donment of the ‘historic’ model was one of the key requests of eastern countries.
Member States applying historical references will have to calculate 40% of their
basic payment on a uniform basis in 2014 to attain a fully uniform payment by
2019. This Basic Payment Scheme will reduce the differences of support among
farmers, types of production, Member States and regions. However, the alloca-
tion of direct payments will still be based on hectares, favouring big landowners.
19.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011e).
20.  For an in-depth analysis, see: MATTHEWS, Alan (2011b).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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The Basic Payment Scheme will be complemented by a series of additional pay-
ments funded under the direct payments national envelope. These include a
mandatory green payment of 30% of the national envelope to farmers following
agricultural practices favourable to the climate and the environment; a special
small farmers’ scheme that could represent up to 10% of the national envelope;
a mandatory additional payment to new young farmers (under the age of 40)
that could reach up to 2% of the national envelope and, a voluntary additional
payment that could represent up to 5% of the national envelope for farmers in
disadvantaged areas.
Analysing the greening measures under the mandatory green payment is not the
subject of this paper but introducing such a payment as a reward of the provi-
sion of public goods can be considered as a more equitable way of distributing
money as it legitimates the granting of support. However, some countries con-
sider that Member States with small national envelopes will not be able to ade-
quately compensate their farmers for the requirements imposed under the green
payment. For instance, a Latvian farmer who receives an average direct payment
of about € 95 per year will not receive the same amount of money as a Dutch
famer who receive an average direct payment of about € 458 per year21, under
the same requirements to get the green payment. 
Many Eastern countries also consider that there is no reason to support young
farmers. In countries with a small number of young farmers and a large national
envelope, these young farmers will receive much higher payments than in coun-
tries with a large number of young farmers and a small national envelope.
The Commission also intends to cap direct income support for the very large
farms that benefit from economies of scale. Direct payments will be progres-
sively capped starting from € 150,000 – with a maximum threshold for pay-
ments of € 300,000 per year. However, a part of the salary and social security
costs can be deducted from the total amount, making capping only applicable
to a very little number of large farms while creating administrative complexity.
Despite the apparent argument of equity, capping will therefore have more a
symbolic than actual meaning and create more problems than benefits.
A restriction of payments to ‘active’ farmers has also been proposed. It should
not permit “sofa farmers” (such as landowners of golf fields or airports) having
no or only marginal agricultural activity to benefit from direct support. This
provision was mainly made in response to Court of Auditors’ reports underly-
ing the lack of precision in the definition of the beneficiaries of direct pay-
21.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011d).INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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ments.22 However, the definition of an ‘active’ farmer retained by the Commis-
sion is rather broad. EU aid would still be given to farmers whose the annual
amount of direct payments represents more than 5% of the annual income
from non-agricultural activities. Accordingly, the Queen of England or some-
one who derives only 6% of its total annual income from farming will still be
considered as ‘active’ farmers. This questionable formula is mainly due to the
fact that the Commission had to find a definition that respects WTO rules and
does not link support to production. Considering that this restriction will also
entail additional bureaucracy for all applicants of direct support, it is important
to ensure that it remains proportionate to the problem.
All these additional payments and new measures should better target certain
farmers and encourage environmentally friendly practices, making – in a limited
way – direct payments ‘fairer’ and more legitimate. However, many Member
States would like to see more flexibility in the application of these Pillar 1 meas-
ures. Moreover, the proposals of capping support and focusing aid only on
active farmers have already faced opposition from several Member States.
Before the adoption of all these measures, trade-offs will therefore have to be
made with other hardly compatible CAP’s objectives, namely competitiveness
and administrative simplicity.
22.  EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2011).23
CONCLUSION
After the analysis of the Commission’s proposals, it is already clear that the CAP
post-2013 will not fundamentally change the allocation of payments among and
within Member States.
The convergence process to reduce income differences between the old and new
Member States proposed by the Commission lacks of ambition and will take
time (one-third of the gap only will be closed by 2019). Moreover, one of the
main criticisms, i.e. the issue of internal disparities among farmers, has barely
been addressed. Although the new ‘Basic Payment Scheme’ and the phasing out
of the historic model are positive elements, the allocation of direct support will
still be based on hectares, favouring big farms. Capping payments per hectare is
therefore crucial but the proposal of the Commission is not likely to be adopted.
The four other Commission’s proposals for greater targeting of payments – the
special scheme for small farmers, the additional support for new young farmers,
the aid for farmers in disadvantaged areas and the support focused on active
farmers – are actually very modest.
For many reasons, it has been observed that the distribution of CAP support
among Member States and farmers goes clearly beyond the simple argument of
equity. Firstly, the CAP is a multi-functional policy that has to cope with several
competitive or complementary objectives. Moreover, the allocation of the CAP’s
budget among countries depends also on the respect of a certain balance with
the budget allocation of other EU policies. Then, the CAP’s history makes it
politically very difficult to redirect money that people got used to receive.
Finally, a significant change in the distribution of the CAP’s budget could have
a strong impact on the farm cost structure, leading to important economical
consequences.
Furthermore, the notion of equity is very abstract. As such, finding a common
EU ground on how to introduce more equity in the CAP is very difficult. Accord-
ing to its agricultural conditions, its policy priorities and its cultural perception
of “fair” distribution, each Member State has its own view on how equity
should be introduced in the CAP. Therefore, the issue of an equitable distribu-
tion of payments must be addressed by common European rules based on objec-
tive criteria, while granting Member States with flexibilities in the allocation of
their national envelope. Leaving subsidiarity to Member States is essential to
tailor measures that better address the increasingly different structures and sit-
uations within EU agriculture. Many Member States have already called for
more flexibility with Pillar 1 measures proposed by the Commission.INTRODUCING MORE EQUITY IN THE CAP: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
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In light of what has been said, it must be acknowledged that reforming the CAP
in order to reach a more equitable distribution of payments is challenging. Fur-
thermore, the small decrease in real terms envisaged for the future CAP budget
and the current situation of economic crisis predict a heated debate to come. The
approach followed by the Commission in its proposals is therefore very prag-
matic. The EU Executive is well aware that the Council and the European Par-
liament would never adopt any proposal with significant distributive changes
among Member States and farmers.25
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